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important is the quantity of money created and not the particular credit
channels by which the money is introduced.
This book is a welcome contribution to the growing monetary literature
and should be read by all serious students in the field. The one criticism, or
rather complaint, I would like to voice concerns the fact that we did not
have the opportunity to read it much sooner. Because most of the evidence
ends in 1966, it is clear that much of this book was completed at least 5
years ago. Although neither Cagan nor the National Bureau is known for an
emphasis on current policy problems, this publication lag still seems shocking
and, with any reasonable discount rate, represents a significant cost to society.
It is also disappointing that the study ends in 1966 because the behavior of
interest rates is somewhat unique in the period since then in terms of the
extremely large amplitude of cyclical movement and the apparent substantial
decrease in the lag of adjustment of price anticipations (the Fisher effect).
It therefore would have been quite instructive if the study could have been
extended to the more recent period.
BENJAMIN KLEIN
University of California, Los A ngeles
Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. By KENNETH J . ARROW.
Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971. Pp. vii + 278. $10.95.
This volume provides an edited collection of Kenneth Arrow's many con-
tributions to contemporary analysis in the economics of uncertainty. The 12
essays are all previously published, except that the third essay, "The Theory
of Risk Aversion," is a considerably expanded version of earlier published
work on the same topic.
Essay 1, "Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-
Taking Situations," provides a comprehensive introduction to the problems
posed by uncertainty for economic analysis. This includes discussion of
probabilistic versus nonprobabilistic, and subjectist versus relative frequentist
views of the treatment of uncertain consequences of decision. A traditional
nontechnical treatment of utility theory is provided—beginning with the
Bernoulli solution to the Saint Petersburg game and progressing through the
von Neumann-Morgenstern-Ramsey utility construction, Wald minimax loss,
and Savage minimax regret criteria for the evaluation of uncertain conse-
quences.
The second essay provides an axiomatic approach to choice under un-
certainty. The expected utility theorem is proved in an unusual way by
exploiting the economic concept of independent goods. This is achieved by
showing that conditional probability distributions over consequences behave
like independent goods in ordinary riskless utility theory. Following Ramsey
and Savage, it is shown that the axiom of probabilistic beliefs can be derived
from other assumptions such as the postulate that preferences among bets
are independent of the prizes.
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The third and fourth essays, "The Theory of Risk Aversion" and "The
Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing," are the most
influential contributions in the book. They are representative examples of
two distinct uses of theory in economic analysis: (1) the use of theory to
explain and understand observable economic behavior and institutions, and
(2) the use of theory to derive the performance characteristics of non-
observed economies and institutions suggested by a reinterpretation of the
arguments and equations of a received theory, or by a mathematical for-
malism. Thus, essay 3 seeks to give precision to the concept of risk aversion
for the purpose of explaining observed aspects of investment, insurance, risk
sharing, and liquidity demand behavior. Essay 4 solves a long-standing in-
tellectual problem in economic theory. The general equilibrium model of the
economy is a deep sophisticated treatment of a naive world of certainty,
costless information, and costless transactions. Essay 4 removes the certainty
stricture on this model by the simple device of reindexing the commodity
space so that cereal is not cereal, but cereal-if-it-rains and cereal-if-it-shines.
This expansion of the ordinary commodity space to a state-contingent com-
modity space, where states are uncertain, permits the general equilibrium
world of certainty and all its results to apply to a general equilibrium world
of uncertainty. All that is required, as Arrow shows, is for there to exist
securities markets in state-contingent claims, that is, "lottery tickets" paying
$1 conditional on state 6 occurring. It is a remarkable commentary on the
nature of the human mind that such a contribution (and it is indeed) should
be considered to have solved a problem. In a sense one can say that it is a
sleight-of-hand dodge of the problem, and it certainly constitutes what earlier
generations of graduate students would have called an "empty box." On the
other hand, I find it useful and insightful to imagine a world of Arrow
certificates in which every good event has its price and every bad event has
its insurance premium so that every portfolio is sharply turned to individual
attitudes toward risk. What is not a legitimate use of the state-contingent
securities model is to make judgments to the effect that the real world econ-
omy is inefficient because there "are not enough markets." The real economy
is not solving the intellectual problem of how to introduce uncertainty into
Pareto-Walras models of general equilibrium. The economy must invent
claim instruments and institutions that permit risk sharing while economizing
on the transactions and information costs of supporting such instruments and
institutions. To this end the economy has invented limited-liability legal in-
stitutions, common shares, priority debt instruments, options, rights, warrants,
multiple-hazard insurance policies, share cropping, oil and gas exploration
leases, life insurance policies for key management and research personnel,
and so on. These real-world institutions lead to risk-sharing contracts with
the important property that return contingencies depend upon collections of
elemental states. Thus, all states that yield a profit provide a proportionate
share of such profits to the common stock holder. Real world contracts are
indivisible packages of Arrow certificates. One must assume that men have
invented such packages out of considerations of economy.
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Essays 5-11 represent applications of the concepts of essays 3 and
especially 4 to insurance markets, invention (or the production of informa-
tion), medical care, and control in large corporations. In these essays. Arrow
is concerned to point out some of the limitations inherent in real-world
markets for risk shifting. Thus, in insurance there is the problem of "moral
hazard," wherein the purchase of insurance may change incentives and there-
fore the probabilities upon which the insurance company relies to compute
premiums. Unlimited fire or health insurance creates incentives for arson
and inessential medical treatment. Investment in the production of new
knowledge tends to be inadequate because of the public good property of
information—if I have it, there is not less for you to have. But institutional
devices mitigate these limitations. Arrow suggests that coinsurance, whereby
the insured pays for a portion of the loss, is an institutional response to
the incentive failures resulting from moral hazard. In medical care, market
failure may occur "because medical care belongs to the category of com-
modities for which the product and the activity of production are identical,"
so that the consumer cannot test the product before consuming it. It seems
to me that the problem simply stated is that the physician is in the position
of deciding what and how much of his services the customer should buy.
The preconditions of consumer sovereignty are not present, and the physician
is confronted with a conflict of interest that is not subject to the usual market
discipline. The same is true of automobile repairing in which the customer
cannot usually be assumed to be competent to judge what he should buy.
The repairman often decides for him and the complaints are legion. This has
led to a new institution—the diagnostic center, which conducts no repair
services, but specializes in the diagnosis of automobile ills. Thus may the
customer hope to buy information untainted by the repairman's conflict of
interest. Such an institution, it would seem, might perform a similar function
in health care.
I have used this book in graduate classes and would recommend it for
courses in decision theory, utility theory, and the economics of uncertainty.
VERNON L. SMITH
California Institute of Technology
Managerial Comparisons of Four Developed Countries: France, Britain,
United States, and Russia. By DAVID GRANICK.
Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1972. Pp. viii-(-394. $15.00.
The shoes began dropping on the second page of the introduction with
Professor Granick's confession of "very serious problems of presentation."
The hints of disarray to come were discounted by the author's reassurance
that various chapters were written for different audiences—some for all
readers, some for industrial sociologists, some for business administration
specialists, and others for economists. The author has in actuality written
three or four books and attempted to integrate them into one.

